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Abstract—As quantum key distribution becomes increasingly
practical, questions of how to effectively employ it in large-
scale networks and over large distances becomes increasingly
important. To that end, in this work, we model the performance
of the E91 entanglement based QKD protocol when operating
in a network consisting of both quantum repeaters and trusted
nodes. We propose a number of routing protocols for this network
and compare their performance under different usage scenarios.
Through our modeling, we investigate optimal placement and
number of trusted nodes versus repeaters depending on device
performance (e.g., quality of the repeater’s measurement devices).
Along the way we discover interesting lessons determining what
are the important physical aspects to improve for upcoming
quantum networks in order to improve secure communication
rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for the establish-
ment of information theoretically secure secret keys between
two or more parties. However, despite their great potential,
these systems face several critical shortcomings when attempt-
ing to implement them in practice. Of particular importance
are improving the speed and distance of these systems. To
overcome these limitations, quantum networks are often used,
consisting of trusted nodes and, in the near future, quantum
repeaters [1], [2]. Since quantum repeaters are still a develop-
ing technology, current QKD networks established in various
metropolitan areas consist only of end-users and trusted nodes
[3]–[7]. However, progress in developing stable quantum re-
peaters has been accelerating of late and so it is vital to
begin developing suitable routing algorithms for networks
consisting of a mixture of both repeaters and trusted nodes.
Indeed, developing efficient routing algorithms to operate in
this setting is vital to the future performance of such networks.
Numerous work has been done investigating the perfor-
mance of quantum networks consisting only of quantum
repeaters (in addition to end users) [8]–[14], including the
development and analysis of new routing protocols specific to
that scenario [15]–[18]. Mostly, the goal of such networks is to
establish end-to-end entanglement between end users (which
may, then, be used for QKD for instance). However, QKD is a
more practical technology today and there are several methods
to improve their performance, such as through trusted nodes.
Thus it is also important to study QKD-specific networks.
Such work has been done investigating practical QKD-specific
networks consisting predominately of trusted nodes and end
users [19]–[21]. However, as repeater technology progresses,
the desire to move away from trusted node technology, and
their inherent security concerns, will become stronger.
Thus, it is important to begin investigating near-future
QKD-specific networks consisting predominately of quantum
repeaters, however with a minority of trusted nodes. Fur-
thermore, these networks will allow for multiple paths to be
established between both repeaters and trusted nodes (i.e.,
repeaters are not used only to extend the distance between
trusted nodes, but will be an integral part of the network
interior). These are the networks we consider in this paper. In
particular, we consider a grid topology in which it is possible
to establish multiple paths between Alice, Bob, and various
trusted nodes though a complex network of repeaters. Our goal
is to understand what routing protocols can lead to efficient
key distribution rates between end users and to understand how
the quality of the repeaters and the number of trusted nodes,
affects the performance of this network.
In this paper, we devise and evaluate three different routing
algorithms for this QKD network: one requires global state
information and the other two are decentralized, distributed,
algorithms requiring only local state information. We perform
a rigorous evaluation, through simulations, of the performance
of our algorithms in a variety of scenarios considering net-
work size; quantum repeater quality; distance between nodes;
quantity and specific location of trusted nodes; and channel
noise. Our results show that the careful design of routing
algorithms is vital to establishing efficient key-distribution
rates between users. Along the way, we discover several
fascinating properties of these networks which may be of great
importance to operators of this future network architecture.
A. Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols operate in two
stages: In the quantum communication stage, users Alice and
Bob use the quantum channel and the authenticated classical
channel to attempt to establish a raw key which is a classical
bit string that is partially correlated (there may be errors in
the quantum channel leading to errors in the raw key) and
partially secret (an adversary may have some information on
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the raw key). Since this raw key cannot be used directly
for cryptographic purposes, a second, purely classical, stage
is performed, running an error correction protocol (leaking
additional information to an adversary) followed by privacy
amplification, which leads to the final secret key. An important
metric in any QKD protocol is the protocol’s key-rate defined
to be the ratio of secret key bits to the size of the raw key.
For a general survey of QKD protocols, the reader is referred
to [22], [23].
In this work, we are interested in the theoretical performance
of a network of QKD systems. As such, we consider ideal
single-qubit sources (though potentially there is loss due to
the fiber channel connecting nodes). Furthermore, we do not
consider finite key effects [24] or imperfect sampling, in an
attempt to understand the theoretical behavior of the network.
Under this setting, the key-rate of the E91 [25] protocol, which
we adopt as the QKD protocol used in our network, is found to
be [26], [27]: rate = 1−2h(Q), where Q is the bit error rate
in the raw key and h(·) is the binary entropy function. Note
that, if we did not assume single-qubit sources and, instead,
weak coherent sources, we would need to use an alternative
key-rate expression or, perhaps, the decoy state BB84 protocol
[28]; these are interesting issues we leave as future work.
Point-to-point QKD systems are often implemented over
fiber channels (though free-space operation is also possible if
one has direct line of sight). One limitation to QKD protocols
is their intolerance to qubit loss [23], [29]; since loss over
a fiber channel scales exponentially with distance, this is
particularly problematic for ground operation. To overcome
this, one may use quantum repeaters [1], [2] and trusted nodes.
Both systems are placed between users, thus halving the total
distance a qubit is required to travel; furthermore, multiple
such nodes may be chained together thus further decreasing
the distance. Quantum repeaters utilize entanglement swapping
to produce a shared entangled bit between two users. Trusted
nodes act as users in a QKD protocol, establishing a key kAT
with Alice and a second, independent key, kTB with Bob. The
trusted node then sends to B (using an authenticated classical
channel) the value kAT ⊕kTB , where ⊕ is the bit-wise XOR.
This allows Alice and Bob to share a classical key, though the
trusted node also shares this key.
The advantage to quantum repeaters is that the final key
A and B produce is independent of the repeater’s knowl-
edge. That is, if a repeater is controlled by an adversary, it
cannot learn the final secret key. However, the technology
for repeaters requires short-term quantum memories which
is a difficult engineering challenge (though the technology
is rapidly advancing). Trusted nodes have the advantage of
simplicity as they are no different in technology than Alice
or Bob. However, they must remain trusted and safe from an
adversary as they do have full knowledge of the secret key.
B. Related Work
There has been recent research in analyzing routing pro-
tocols, along with the general behavior and performance,
of quantum networks consisting of end-users and quantum
repeaters, but no trusted nodes; see for instance [8]–[18]
with [15]–[18] giving particular focus on specific routing
protocols for certain network topologies in generating shared
entanglement between users, which is a stronger resource
than QKD. However, QKD is, currently, a more practical
and mature technology and, furthermore, there are numerous
methods of improving the performance (speed and distance) of
these systems that are unavailable to entanglement generation
networks, namely the use of trusted nodes. Thus, while routing
protocols designed for an entanglement-generation quantum
internet can be used also for QKD, more efficient systems may
exist and, furthermore, solutions incorporating both trusted
nodes and repeaters are vital for near-term deployment of this
technology and are the networks we consider in this work.
Early work on QKD-specific networks focused on algo-
rithms for optical-based switching networks [30]. Such net-
works were used in practice, for instance the 2004 DARPA
network in the Boston area [3], [31] and the 2009 network
in Hefei [4], utilized such an architecture (the Hefei network
also utilized trusted nodes). These networks consisted of end-
users and optical switches allowing users to route qubits to
each other.
A more capable QKD network consists of end-users and
trusted nodes and is the most common of network architectures
for practical QKD networks in operation today such as the
SECOQC network in Vienna [5], the previously mentioned
Hefei network [4], the Tokyo QKD network [7] and the
Beijing-Shanghai network [6]. In terms of routing algorithms,
the Vienna network used a variant of the OSPF routing
algorithm [19]. In [32], required functionalities of a QKD
network routing algorithm were described for this form of
network and a routing protocol was proposed, while [21] began
constructing routing protocols for larger scale networks evalu-
ated through simulations. A novel quality of service model for
these networks, and new routing protocols, were introduced in
[33]. A complete QKD network stack for such networks was
proposed in [20], along with advanced routing functionalities
through trusted nodes taking into account channel performance
and key-rate demands, while in [34], a mathematical model
was proposed for analyzing such trusted-node QKD networks.
The severe limitation to trusted nodes is that, as their name
implies, they must be trusted. Indeed, a trusted node is fully
aware of the secret key which A and B distill (multi-path rout-
ing is one counter-measure to this, though still imperfect). An
advancement from this would be the use of quantum repeaters.
However, while the technology for these is advancing rapidly,
it is more likely that in the near-future, any QKD network will
consist of both repeaters and trusted nodes. Thus, developing
new and efficient routing algorithms specific for this network
technology, is vital. In this work, we consider networks that
consist of a majority of repeaters with a minority of trusted
nodes, attempting to discover optimal routing protocols for this
scenario and to understand the behavior of such a network.
Note that in [20], the use of quantum repeaters in a chain to
link together different trusted nodes was considered an option;
here, however, we are considering more complex networks
of repeaters, allowing for potential multi-path routing options
between both trusted nodes and multiple repeaters.
II. MODEL AND SIMULATOR
In this work we consider a grid network consisting of
N × N nodes with each node connected to at most four
others, their immediate neighbors up, down, left, and right.
These connections represent fiber links allowing for the direct
transmission of qubits between neighboring nodes only. We
assume a classical communication network allowing any pair
of nodes to send classical messages. We do not assume this
communication is secret; however for all user and trusted node
communication we do assume it is authenticated. Each node
in this network may be either a User (Alice or Bob); a Trusted
Node; or a Quantum Repeater. We place Alice at the lower-
left corner of the network and Bob in the upper-right (thus,
these users have only two neighbors they are connected to).
Later, we will simulate alternative numbers and locations of
the trusted nodes; however, predominately the other nodes will
consist of quantum repeaters in contrast to current day QKD
networks.
Users and trusted nodes perform the E91 QKD protocol.
For notation, we assume there are n trusted nodes denoted
T1, . . . , Tn. We label Alice as T0 and Bob as Tn+1. For every
pair of users and trusted nodes there exists a private raw-key
pool; that is, for every i, j ∈ {0, · · · , n+1}, with i < j, there
exists a buffer RKi,j , storing the raw key shared between
nodes Ti and Tj . Note that repeaters do not have key buffers.
As we are using the entanglement based E91 protocol, the first
goal of the network is to establish joint entanglement between
these pairs of nodes Ti and Tj , ideally the Bell state |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉). This resource may be used to establish a
secret key between users.
The quantum network we analyze operates in rounds, each
round consisting of three primary stages (see examples in
Figures 1 and 2). The first stage, and part of the second
stage, are standard in repeater-only quantum networks (see
[17], [18]). As mentioned, nodes have at most four inputs
into them (since the two users are at the corner of grid, they
each only have two inputs); we assume that nodes have the
capability of storing a single qubit in short-term memory for
each of these inputs, through one complete round. After the
round is complete, any qubits not measured, are discarded.
That is, the memory capabilities of nodes are not sufficient
to store a qubit through two or more rounds in our network.
Note that users in our network have the fewest demands on
quantum memory.
In the first stage, adjacent nodes attempt to share an entan-
gled pair, in particular the Bell state |Φ+〉, with one particle
remaining at a local node and the other being transmitted to an
adjacent node. Due to fiber loss, this succeeds with a certain
probability p = 10−αL/10 where α is the fiber attenuation
coefficient (we use α = .15 in our later simulations). Further-
more, even if successful, the entangled pair may not be a Bell
state |Φ+〉 but instead will, with probability D, depolarize and
become completely mixed. Ultimately, after this first stage,
adjacent nodes u and v will either not have any qubit in their
short-term memory (with probability 1−p) or, with probability
p, they will share a quantum state of the form:
ρu,v = (1−D) |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|+D · I
4
, (1)
where I is the identity operator on two qubits. Note this D may
be used to model channel noise along with noise internal to the
quantum memory of the repeater. As is standard in repeater-
network analyses [17], [18], we assume that nodes are able
to determine whether a qubit has arrived in their short-term
quantum memory or if it is a vacuum.
In the second stage, a routing protocol, to be discussed
(see Section III), is performed to decide how to effectively
route entanglement between nodes Ti and Tj for i 6= j.
This routing protocol can take into account whether nodes
have a qubit in their short-term memory. The goal of this
stage, and in particular the routing algorithm, is to determine
a set of paths, the end-points of which are either users
or trusted nodes, while the interior nodes of each path are
quantum repeaters. Given these paths, the quantum repeaters
will perform entanglement swapping operations on the qubits
that are locally held in their short-term memory, which, if
successful, create “virtual” entangled links between the end-
points of each path. The entanglement swapping operations at
the repeaters, which themselves consist of Bell measurements,
succeed only with a certain probability that we denote as
B. We assume the network is able to determine whether a
successful entanglement swapping occurred or not. Thus, at
the end of this stage, end-nodes Ti and Tj on each path can
determine whether the network was successful in creating an
end-to-end path between these nodes. Note that they cannot
tell if the state they share is the correct Bell state |Φ+〉 or
the completely mixed state I/4 due to depolarization. At this
point, repeaters are no longer needed until the next round, and
users and trusted nodes share a state of the form in Equation
(2), where the probabilities of the mixed state depend on D
and the path length – in particular, on a path consisting of k
interior nodes, the shared state will either be:
ρTiTj = (1−D)k+1 |φ+〉 〈φ+|+ (1− [1−D]k+1) ·
I
4
, (2)
or a vacuum if one or more repeaters failed in their entangle-
ment swapping operation.
Finally, in the third stage, all pairs Ti and Tj of users and
trusted nodes which have a shared state, and not a vacuum,
attempt to distill a raw-key bit using the E91 QKD protocol. If
successful (which depends on users choosing the correct basis,
and as such it is successful with probability 1/2), the key-bit is
added to a local raw key-pool for those usersRKi,j . Any qubit
that was not measured by now is discarded and the network
repeats at stage 1, attempting to establish fresh entangled pairs
between adjacent nodes. Refer to Figures 1 and 2.
We wrote a custom simulator to simulate the behavior of
this network and these three stages. This simulator maintains
a raw-key pool RKi,j between each pair of users Ti and Tj
as would be done in an actual operation of this network. In
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(a) Initial network
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(b) Stage 1
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(c) Stage 2
Fig. 1. (a) The initial network of a 5× 5 grid, with a central trusted node (T ) between Alice (A) and Bob (B). (b) A possible network configuration after
stage 1, in which some nodes succeed in establishing a shared state of the form in Equation (1) with their neighbors over the fiber channels and some do not.
(c) Successful entanglement chaining and routing (depicted as the “internal links” at repeaters) as discussed in Stage 2. In this graph, routing has resulted in
end-to-end paths being created between each pair of A, B and T . These routes are successful only if every Bell state measurement along the path succeeds.
Furthermore, the probability of decoherence increases with the path length in our model as discussed; thus minimizing the path lengths through effective
routing algorithms and trusted nodes is advantageous. See also Figure 2.
(b)
(a)
(d)
T
(c)
T
A (e)
(f)
Fig. 2. A legend for our network diagrams. Left: (a) denotes a node in
the network, specifically a repeater with 4 (b) connection terminals from
which entangled photons are sent and received over (c) fiber optic connections
between other repeaters and (d) trusted nodes. Right: an entangled channel
(e) connecting multiple trusted nodes through intra-node entanglement (f).
practice, nodes Ti and Tj will, once the length of the raw key
in RKi,j is sufficiently large, perform error correction and pri-
vacy amplification, leading to a secret key of size |Ki,j |. In our
simulations, we are interested in the theoretical performance
of this network, and so we only do this process once at the
end of the simulation and set |Ki,j | = |RKi,j | · (1 − 2h(Q))
where Q is the error in the raw key pool RKi,j and where
h(x) = x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the binary entropy
function. Again, as we are only interested in theoretical
behavior, we compute Q based on the actual simulator data;
in practice Q may be estimated by sampling from RKi,j .
Of course, the ultimate goal of the network is to maximize
the secret key pool between Alice and Bob (i.e., T0 and Tn+1).
If n = 0 (i.e., there is no trusted node), at this point, we
are done. However for n ≥ 1, a final key-routing process
is required of the trusted nodes who must attempt to “push”
a maximal amount of key material to Alice and Bob. For
n = 1, this is trivial: T1 will simply broadcast K0,1 ⊕ K1,2
(here, T0 is Alice and T2 is Bob); if they are not of equal
length, then only the left-portion is broadcast. Alice and Bob
already have a secret key of size |K0,2| before this process.
Thus, finally, they end up with a secret key of total size
|K0,2|+min(|K0,1|, |K1,2|). When n > 1 the situation is more
complicated; in this work we use the max-flow algorithm to
determine how many additional bits are appended to K0,n+1.
Note that, at the end, not all key bits in trusted node pools may
be usable if there is an insufficient amount of key material in
“matching” nodes. Later, when we evaluate performance of our
routing protocols, we will look at the key-rate of the network,
namely the size of the final secret key between Alice and Bob
(after the trusted nodes perform this final key-routing process)
divided by the total number of network rounds.
III. ROUTING PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present three routing protocols that are
used to form end-to-end paths for the second stage in a round.
These end-to-end paths have either users or trusted nodes as
end nodes and have quantum repeaters as intermediary nodes.
We first present a high-level overview of these three protocols,
and then describe each in detail.
A. High-level Overview
The three routing protocols are designed to (i) find short
paths, and (ii) find as many paths as possible, so that these
paths can lead to higher chances of shared state (see Equation
(2)) and can be used in aggregation to lead to more key
bits. One of them relies on global link-state information, i.e.,
each node has the full knowledge of the external links in the
network (i.e., the entanglement between pair of nodes that
were created successfully in the first stage in a round). The
other two protocols only require local link-state information,
i.e., a node only knows which neighbors it shares a quantum
state with and knows nothing beyond its neighbors. The
network topology (including the locations of the users and
the trusted nodes) is known for all protocols. With the global
knowledge, the global routing protocol is more likely to find
better paths than the local routing protocols. On the other
hand, gathering global information incurs longer latency since
the link state information has to be propagated throughout the
AT
B
(i)
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(b) Local algorithm: NIA
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the three routing algorithms, where A, B and T denote Alice, Bob, and a trusted node respectively; the distances from a node to A,
B and T are marked above the node. (a) The global routing algorithm finds three paths, between A and T , B and T , and A and B, respectively. (b) The
NIA algorithm finds two paths, one between A and T , and the other between B and T . The choice of the quantum repeater at location (i) cuts off a path
between A and B. (c) The IA algorithm finds three paths; the choice of the quantum repeater at location (i) allows forming a path between A and B.
network, while local link-state information is already available
at the end of the first stage, and thus incurs no additional
latency. As a result, the global routing protocol may only be
applicable to small networks, while the local routing protocols
can also be used in large networks.
The three routing protocols are inspired by the work in
[17], where the authors consider routing between a pair of
end users, without leveraging trusted nodes. We extend them
to the scenarios with trusted nodes. Of the two local routing
protocols we develop, one significantly outperforms the other
(see Section IV), which can also be applied to scenarios with
no trusted nodes in [17].
B. Global Routing Protocol
The global routing protocol selects the shortest path (in
hops) between any pair of nodes in {T0, T1, . . . , Tn+1}, where
T0 is Alice, Tn+1 is Bob, and T1, . . . , Tn are trusted nodes.
When two paths of equal length are found, one of them
is selected randomly. Then all the links along the path are
removed, and the procedure repeats for the remaining links
until no path can be found. Fig. 3(a) illustrates this algorithm.
In this example, there is only a single trusted node T in the
center of the network. The first shortest path found is the path
(of 4 hops) between Bob and the trusted node T . After the
links along this path are removed, the second shortest path (of
4 hops) found is the path between Alice and T . After that, a
path (of 8 hops) between Alice and Bob is found.
C. Local Routing Protocols
The two local routing protocols are closely related. In both
algorithms, each repeater makes its own decisions on forming
an “internal link” (i.e., performing entanglement swapping on
two qubits in its short-term memory). We next describe the
action at an arbitrary repeater u. For ease of exposition, we
assume there is only a single trusted node T in the network
(the description below can be extended easily to multiple
trusted nodes). Furthermore, without loss of generality, we
assume u has four neighbors, denoted as ua, ub, ul and ur,
corresponding to the nodes that are above, below, to the left
of, and to the right of u, respectively. Let DA(ua), DB(ua)
and DT (ua) denote the distance (in hops) from ua to Alice,
Bob and trusted node T , respectively. Similarly, define the
distances for u’s other neighbors. Since each node knows
the network topology, all the above distance values of u’s
neighbors are known to u, which are used in u’s decision
making. Specifically, in a given round, u checks how many
neighbors it shares quantum state with. If it shares quantum
state with fewer than two neighbors, then it does nothing
(i.e., no “internal link” can be created). If it shares quantum
state with exactly two neighbors, it simply connects these two
neighbors. Otherwise (i.e., it shares quantum state with more
than two neighbors), it connects the two neighbors that have
the shortest distances to two unique nodes including Alice,
Bob and the trusted node. Afterwards, if there still remain two
neighbors that u shares quantum state with (i.e., u established
a quantum state with all four of its neighbors), then u connects
these two remaining neighbors.
The two local routing algorithms only differ in how they
deal with ties. Specifically, if two potential sets of connections
are equal in distance, the first local algorithm breaks the tie
randomly, while the second algorithm favors horizontal or
vertical “internal links”, which has the effect of simplifying
the paths that are created, and limiting the number of times one
path utilizes a link that is integral to the formation of another
path (see example below). We refer to the first local routing
algorithm as Non-Intersection Avoidant (NIA) algorithm, while
we refer to the second one as Intersection Avoidant (IA)
algorithm. While these two algorithms only differ slightly,
our simulation results in Section IV demonstrate that the IA
algorithm can significantly outperform the NIA algorithm. In
fact, the performance of the IA algorithm approaches that of
the global algorithm in some scenarios.
Fig. 3(b) illustrates the NIA algorithm. In the example, the
algorithm finds two paths, one between Alice and the trusted
node T , and the other between Bob and T . At location (i), the
repeater attempts to connect node A (which has a minimum
distance of 0 from Alice) with one of the other two neighbors,
which have equal distance to the trusted node T . The algorithm
selects one at random, which happens to be the neighbor to
its right. While this “internal link” becomes part of a path
from A to T , it has a negative impact in that it cuts off
any paths between Alice and Bob (or between Alice and T )
that go through the nodes above (i). The above problem does
not happen in the IA algorithm (see Fig. 3(c)), where the
repeater at location (i) connects the node above with node A,
leading to a vertical “internal link”, which becomes part of the
longer path leading to Bob while another path is established
to connect Alice with T . In summary, in this example the IA
algorithm is able to establish a path between Alice and T , Bob
and T , and a link between Alice and Bob, just as the global
algorithm does, while the NIA algorithm lacks the logic to
enforce this outcome. Our large-scale simulation in Section IV
demonstrates that the IA algorithm leads to statistically better
performance than the NIA algorithm.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of quantum key
distribution in quantum networks using the various routing al-
gorithms. We will compare the performance of the algorithms
in a number of settings and investigate the impact of various
parameters on the performance.
A. Evaluation Setup
We consider the scenarios where Alice and Bob are placed
at the two corners of an N ×N grid. The parameters related
to network topology include the size of the grid (N ) and
the length of the fiber channel of each edge (horizontal or
vertical) of the grid (L). The quality of the quantum network
is represented by the probability of a successful Bell state
measurement (BSM) at a repeater (B), and the probability
of decoherence (D, see Equation 2). Note that L is the
fiber length between neighboring two nodes. Since Alice and
Bob are at opposite corners of the entire grid network, the
actual distance, therefore, between the two users is actually√
2(N −1)L. Table I summarizes these parameters, with their
default values and range of the values.
The performance metric is key rate, i.e., the average number
of secret key-bits generated between Alice and Bob per round
of network use as discussed in Section II. Unless otherwise
stated, the number of rounds we simulate for each test and
for each setting is 106. We also evaluate the network’s per-
formance when there are no trusted nodes; a single trusted
node; and two trusted nodes, along with different location
configurations.
B. No Trusted Nodes
We first investigate the scenario with no trusted node and
only repeaters. These results serve as baselines to demon-
strate the benefits of having trusted nodes in the network in
TABLE I
PARAMETERS EXPLORED IN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.
Parameter Default Range Description
N 5 5 - 15 The network consists of N2
nodes arranged in an N×N grid.
L 1 km 1 - 20 km The length of the fiber connecting
neighboring nodes. The distance
between Alice and Bob scales
with both N and L.
B .85 0.65 - 1.00 Represents the quality of the re-
peaters. A Bell state measure-
ment succeeds at a repeater with
probability B.
D .02 0.00 - 0.06 Represents the amount of noise in
the channels. EPR pairs decohere
with probability D.
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Fig. 4. Impact of various parameters on key rate when there is no trusted
node in the network (5 × 5 grid). Note, as discussed, “fiber length” L is
the length between nodes. Thus, the actual distance between the two users is
actually
√
2(N − 1)L.
Sections IV-C and IV-D. Fig. 4(a) plots the key rate when
varying the fiber length, L, for a 5×5 grid. The results of the
three routing algorithms are plotted in the figure. As expected,
since increasing the fiber length leads to higher fiber loss, the
key rate decreases with L. The global routing algorithm, also
as expected, outperforms the two local algorithms. Between
the two local algorithms, the intersection-avoidance (IA) al-
gorithm significantly outperforms non-intersection-avoidance
(NIA) algorithm, particularly for lower fiber lengths. The
difference between the global algorithm and IA algorithm
is small for short fiber length, and increases when the fiber
length increases, where having global knowledge allows the
algorithm to find paths, even when they are longer and more
complicated.
Fig. 4(b) plots key rate when increasing the decoherence
rate D. We again observe that the global routing algorithm
outperforms the two local algorithms, and the IA algorithm
significantly outperforms the NIA algorithm. As expected,
increasing the decoherence rate leads to lower key rates; the
decrease is particularly dramatic when increasing the decoher-
ence rate from 0 to 2%. As an example, for the global routing
algorithm, the key rate decreases from .3 key-bits/round to just
over .07 key-bits/round when increasing the decoherence rate
from 0 to 2%. We also note that, interestingly, while both the
global and IA algorithms achieve a key rate around .07 at 2%
decoherence, the NIA algorithms, under the ideal condition
of 0% decoherence, achieves the same key rate of .07 key-
bits/round. The drastic advantage of the IA algorithm over the
NIA algorithm highlights the importance of designing effective
local routing algorithms.
Fig. 4(c) plots key rate when varying B, the probability that
the Bell state measurement at a repeater succeeds. The relative
performance across the three routing algorithms is similar as
the above two scenarios. Of note, it is evident that increasing
the reliability of these measurements can lead to a significantly
improved key rate. At a 75% success rate, for example, the
global algorithm achieves just under .026 key-bits/second, but
an increase to 95% or even 100% success rates allows us to
achieve key rates of approximately .153 and .216 respectively.
Last, Fig. 4(d) demonstrates the impact of network size
N on key rate. Note that, by increasing N (the number
of nodes in the network) but keeping the horizontal/vertical
distance between two adjacent nodes fixed at 1 km, we are
effectively increasing the total distance between Alice and
Bob (they are at the two corners of the grid). For all the
routing algorithms, the key rate decreases when the network
size (i.e., total distance) increases. This is expected since, as
the network size increases, the path between Alice and Bob
becomes longer, and therefore the overall error (see Equation
2) and probability of a path failing increases, leading to lower
key rate. Of the three routing algorithms, the global algorithm
is less affected compared with the other two algorithms since
it is more capable of finding longer paths as the network size
increases than the two local algorithms.
We observe that, as the distance between the end users A
and B increases, even using quantum repeaters with perfect
internal performance (i.e., B = 1), the efficiency of the entire
network degrades rapidly (we shall discuss this further in in
Fig. 6). We show in the following sections how even a single
trusted node can dramatically improve the performance of
QKD, indicating that, even in the future as repeater technology
becomes more prevalent, trusted nodes may still be necessary
to ensure high key rate when the distance between end users
is significant.
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Fig. 5. Impact of various parameters on key rate when there is one trusted
node in the network (5× 5 grid).
C. Single Trusted Node
We now consider the scenario where a single trusted node
is placed at the center of the network grid, and investigate
the impact of various parameters on key rate in this scenario.
Figures 5(a)-(d) plot the key rate when varying the fiber
length, decoherence rate, BSM success rate and network size,
respectively. The results show that, under all three routing
algorithms, having one trusted node leads to significantly
higher key rate than the same setting with no trusted node
(see Fig. 4). As an example, when there is no trusted node,
as shown in Fig. 4(a), the maximal key rate achieved for the
global algorithm was .07 key-bits/round, while it is .3 key-
bits/round, more than 3× higher, as shown in Fig. 5(a) when
there is one trusted node.
Comparing Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 4(a), we see that for the global
algorithm, when varying the fiber length from 1 to 15 km, the
key rates with one trusted node are .08-.25 higher than that
with no trusted node under the same setting, corresponding
to a 1.9-4.4× increase; the corresponding increases in key
rate for IA and NIA algorithms are 1.2-8.8× and 2.1 - 9.2×,
respectively. In fact, with one trusted node and in the same
setting, the NIA algorithm achieves greater key rates than
even the global algorithm could with no trusted nodes. This
is because the trusted node essentially reduces the “size” of
the network, allowing shorter paths to be constructed between
Alice/Bob and the trusted node, As the local algorithms have
information on a higher fraction of the total network for
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Fig. 6. (a) The capabilities of the network when operating in an idealized
scenario with no BSM failures (i.e. perfect repeaters) and 2% decoherence
probability. (b) The capabilities of the network with 5% decoherence proba-
bility and 85% BSM success probability.
smaller networks, this reduction in the effective size of the
network has a particularly strong effect on the local algorithms.
This trend is also exhibited in Figs. 5(b)-(d). Where, again
comparing with their counterparts in Fig. 4, we see that
the addition of a trusted node results in an almost two-fold
increase in maximum achievable key-rate for the cases of
decoherence, BSM success rate and network size.
In Fig. 6, we show the performance of the three algorithms
with no trusted nodes and one trusted node in two additional
channel scenarios: perfect BSM success probability with 2%
decoherence and 85% BSM success probability with 5%
decoherence. In Fig. 6(a), we see that even with the elimination
of BSM failures, as the length increases between nodes the
key rate still drops significantly. We see that even the NIA
algorithm with a central trusted node (TN) outperforms the
global algorithm with no TN, as the shorter paths between
the parties and the TN are simply more likely to exist than
the longer paths that must exist to connect Alice and Bob
in the no TN case. In Fig. 6(b) we consider a less idealized
scenario, in which the BSM probability is our default of 85%
and our decoherence rate is higher, at 5%. We see that for
this scenario, not even the global algorithm can achieve a
positive key rate for the no TN case (at least in 106 rounds
of the network), and that in general the key rates achieved
by the central TN is significantly lower (between 5 − 10×)
than was achieved with 2% decoherence in Fig. 5(a). It is
notable, however, that in Fig. 6(b) we see that using 1 TN,
each algorithm is able to maintain a positive key rate even
when there is a 5% decoherence rate, and Alice and Bob are
separated by 113 km (when L = 20 km, considering a 5× 5
network grid).
D. Multiple Trusted Nodes
We now consider having two trusted nodes in the network.
Specifically, we investigate three methods of placing these two
trusted nodes, referred to as corner, diagonal, and asymmetric
placements. In the corner placement, the two trusted nodes
are located at the two opposite corners of the graph (distinct
from Alice and Bob’s corners); in the diagonal placement,
the two trusted nodes are placed evenly along the diagonal
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C B
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R D
Fig. 7. A 7 × 7 network with 3 different ways of placing the two trusted
nodes. The nodes labeled with A and B are Alice and Bob in each type of
placement; the two nodes labeled with C are the trusted nodes in the corner
placement; the two nodes labeled with D are the trusted nodes in the diagonal
placement; and the two nodes labeled with R are the two trusted nodes in the
asymmetric placement.
between Alice and Bob; in the asymmetric placement, one
trusted node is located in the center, while the other is located
one node along the diagonal closer to Alice. Fig. 7 illustrates
the above three types of placement for a 7× 7 grid (we use a
7× 7 instead of a 5× 5 grid as the diagonal placement only
performs optimally for grid size N = 3x+ 1 for some integer
x).
Figures 8(a) through (c) plot the key rate as the decoherence
rate increases for each of the above types of placement for
the global, IA and NIA routing algorithms, respectively. For
comparison, in each figure, the results with a single trusted
node placed in the center and no trusted node are also plotted
in the figure. We see that for the global routing algorithm (see
Fig. 8(a)), the diagonal placement outperforms the other four
cases (i.e., corner and asymmetric placement of two trusted
nodes, as well as no trusted node and placing a single trusted
node in the center) by a large margin.
The clustering of the non-diagonal configurations we at-
tribute to two separate reasons. First, consider that in the cen-
tral configuration, an optimal pathing results in two channels
connecting Alice to the trusted node, and two more connecting
the trusted node to Bob. Importantly, these channels will
consist of 6 edges each. In the corner configuration, an optimal
pathing results in one channel between Alice and each of
the two trusted nodes, and likewise from Bob to the trusted
nodes. Again, these channels will consist of 6 edges each. As
a result, at least in the global case, the likelihood that these
paths exist, that the channels are successfully established and
that the entanglement remains coherent are all equivalent. It
stands to reason then, and the data reflects that reasoning,
that the corner configuration and the central configuration are
equivalent, in terms of performance. In the other case, it is
the asymmetry that causes the equality. Although the second
trusted node does result in Alice and the central trusted node
sharing a larger key, the central trusted node and Bob establish
no more key-bits than if the second trusted node did not exist.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
Decoherence prob.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Ke
y 
Ra
te
0-No TN
1-Central
2-Corner
2-Diagonal
2-Asymmetric
(a) Global
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
Decoherence prob.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Ke
y 
Ra
te
0-No TN
1-Central
2-Corner
2-Diagonal
2-Asymmetric
(b) Intersection Avoidant
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
Decoherence prob.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Ke
y 
Ra
te
0-No TN
1-Central
2-Corner
2-Diagonal
2-Asymmetric
(c) Non-Intersection Avoidant
Fig. 8. Key rate versus the decoherence rate for the three routing algorithms in a 7 × 7 grid with L = 1 km and B = .85. We consider the No TN case,
the Central TN case, and the 2 TN cases in which there are two trusted nodes in the network, following corner, diagonal or asymmetric placements.
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Fig. 9. Key rate versus the network size for the global and IA routing
algorithms for a 10 km × 10 km network grid where the fiber length between
each node decreases as the network size increases. Notably, we see some non-
monotonicity as the diagonal configuration does not operate effectively at grid
sizes that are not of the form 3x+1 for some integer x, and the central case
does not operate effectively at even grid sizes such as 10x10.
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Fig. 10. Key rate versus the BSM Success rate for the global and IA routing
algorithms in a 7 × 7 grid with L = 1 km and D = .02. We consider the
no TN case, the central TN case, and the 2 TN cases in which there are
two trusted nodes in the network, following corner, diagonal or asymmetric
placements.
As a result, in the final routing of key material, the overall
capacity between Alice and Bob remains unchanged, and so
the additional key-bits that Alice and the trusted node were
able to establish go unused. Finally, the over-performance of
the diagonal configuration is a result, as one would expect,
from the further segmentation of the 7 × 7 network into 3
distinct sub-networks: between Alice and the first trusted node;
the first and second trusted nodes; and finally the second
trusted node and Bob. As shown in the figure, this additional
trusted node can increase our key rate by almost a factor of
1.5 over the central trusted node configuration.
We repeat the above investigation for the IA algorithm
(see Fig. 8(b)). Again, we see that the diagonal placement
outperforms the others, and that the performance of the corner
placement of two trusted nodes is very similar to that when
placing a single trusted node in the center. We also see,
however, that the redundant trusted node in the asymmetric
case results in a large detriment to the key rate, dropping it
almost a full .3 key-bits/round. This is likely due to the greedy
nature of the routing algorithm – having an additional node
complicates the decision process of the repeaters near both
trusted nodes, potentially wasting edges that otherwise could
have been utilized in a more effective manner.
The differences in the performance of the different types
of placement are even more dramatic for the NIA algorithm
in Fig. 8(c). For each configuration we see a significant
drop in performance, except for the corner placement, which
remains relatively consistent with its performance in the other
algorithms. This difference can be explained by the fact
that that the NIA algorithm does not generally struggle with
intersecting paths in the corner case, as the optimal paths
themselves tend not to contain many right angles. The effect
of this is so great, in fact, that at lower error rates the corner
configuration in fact outperforms the diagonal configuration,
until the shorter hop-length of the channels in the diagonal
configuration becomes the dominating factor in determining
key rate.
As physical distance between Alice and Bob increases,
one might think that there is benefit to be had by adding
additional repeaters and decreasing the distance between nodes
themselves. We investigate whether or not this is feasible in
Fig. 9 in which the physical distance the network spans is
fixed at 10 km × 10 km, while the number of nodes in the
grid is increased (this is in contrast to our other simulations
where the total width of the network was not fixed, but instead,
the length and width are both (N − 1) · L km). What we see
is that the tendency for BSM failure chance and decoherence
probability to increase as path sizes increase puts a damper on
any benefit that can be achieved through this method. In some
scenarios it is likely that there are trade-offs that can be made,
depending on the target distance between Alice and Bob,
BSM success probabilities, and decoherence probabilities, but
evidently there are limitations inherent to trying to augment
the key rate using this method.
It is clear, however, that this limitation can be alleviated
in part by the addition of trusted nodes. As can be seen in
Fig. 9, while the key rate of each configuration decreases as
the size increases, even as the fiber length decreases, additional
trusted nodes remain effective in boosting the key rate. As a
result, it is still possible to increase network size to alleviate
fiber length concerns, as long as the number of trusted nodes
is also increased. Additionally, Fig. 9 showcases the way in
which non-optimal grid sizes affect key rate for the different
TN configurations. Namely, we see that the key rate of the
diagonal configuration actually increases between N = 5 and
N = 7, or N = 9 and N = 10, as we move from grid sizes
not of the form 3x + 1 to grid sizes of that form. We see
the same for the central configuration at the even grid size of
N = 10, where the node is placed slightly off center, and as
such actually increases at N = 11.
Finally, in Fig. 10 we consider the performance of the
global and IA algorithms on a number of TN configurations
as the BSM success probability increases. Again, we see that
the general trend is the same between the global and IA
algorithms, with the global algorithm outperforming the IA
algorithm in each configuration, and especially the asymmetric
case. In the diagonal configuration, with perfect quantum
repeaters (i.e. B = 1), both are able to achieve a key rate
of more than .45 key-bits/round with 2 TN in the diagonal
configuration, and with 1 TN in the center, the IA algorithm
and global algorithms achieve key rates of .3 and .33 key-
bits/round, respectively. The above results are notable, because
they give some sense of the trends we might expect to see as
quantum repeater technology advances. They also show the
great benefit to using trusted nodes, even with perfect, ideal,
repeaters.
V. SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS
The data suggests a number of interesting lessons regarding
this sort of QKD network. Most glaringly, it is immediately
evident that the addition of even a single trusted node into a
network can greatly increase what key rates are achievable,
even with ideal repeater technology. Further, we see that a
small adjustment to the natural local routing algorithm, in the
form of a tendency to avoid intersection of paths, can lead to
increases in key rate comparable to, or even exceeding, that of
the addition of a single trusted node, with a negligible increase
in complexity. As we have seen, this increase in key rates
generalizes to multiple trusted nodes, on larger grids, but there
is some consideration that must be given to the placement of
the additional trusted nodes. Indeed, a non-optimal placement
of trusted nodes can in fact hinder the operation of the network,
especially for the local algorithms.
The data further suggests some lessons regarding the lim-
itations of such a network. We see that while fiber length
plays an important role in determining key rate, it is the
BSM success probability and the decoherence rate that are
seemingly the largest obstacles to achieving a higher key rate.
This relationship is no more evident than in Fig. 9, where we
see that these factors play an important role in limiting the total
distance the network can cover, as they make it infeasible to
mitigate the effects of fiber length by simply adding additional
nodes to the network. In fact doing so can actually decrease
key rates, if not counterbalanced with the addition of trusted
nodes.
Finally, our analysis makes clear the important role trusted
nodes will still have to play after quantum repeater networks
become practical, or even perfect. As was shown in Fig. 10,
even with perfect quantum repeaters, the addition of trusted
nodes can result in positive and significant key rates being
achieved where they were otherwise not possible. Trusted
nodes can be used in the networks to facilitate the establish-
ment of efficient QKD networks reaching along far distances
consisting of many nodes. In fact, one can even conceive of
network models in which the trusted nodes also operate as part
of a multi-party QKD system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have proposed a novel model for analyzing
the performance of quantum repeater QKD grid networks with
the inclusion of a minority of trusted nodes. We proposed
three routing algorithms, and evaluate the performance of the
E91 QKD protocol when using them for a variety of channel
and network configurations. We discuss general lessons that
can be drawn from our results, including the importance
of not only the inclusion of trusted nodes, but also their
placement, and some general limitations inherent to working
with such networks. Note that our approach can also be used
to determine network resources needed to achieve desired
rates between users at given distances or with given repeater
quality. Our work in this paper can serve as a baseline for
future exploration of this area, and we leave open as future
work issues such as the development of better local and
global algorithms; analysis of mutli-party networks of this
form; analysis of more complicated, potentially asymmetric
networks; analytic results regarding the capabilities of these
networks; the possibility of embedding Alice and Bob as part
of a larger network, rather than at the corners; as well as the
extension of this analysis to additional QKD protocols.
REFERENCES
[1] H.-J. Briegel, W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, “Quantum repeaters: The
role of imperfect local operations in quantum communication,” Phys.
Rev. Lett., vol. 81, pp. 5932–5935, Dec 1998.
[2] N. Sangouard, C. Simon, H. De Riedmatten, and N. Gisin, “Quantum
repeaters based on atomic ensembles and linear optics,” Reviews of
Modern Physics, vol. 83, no. 1, p. 33, 2011.
[3] C. Elliott, “The darpa quantum network,” arXiv preprint quant-
ph/0412029, 2004, unpublished.
[4] T.-Y. Chen, J. Wang, H. Liang, W.-Y. Liu, Y. Liu, X. Jiang, Y. Wang,
X. Wan, W.-Q. Cai, L. Ju, et al., “Metropolitan all-pass and inter-
city quantum communication network,” Optics express, vol. 18, no. 26,
pp. 27217–27225, 2010.
[5] M. Peev, C. Pacher, R. Alle´aume, C. Barreiro, J. Bouda, W. Boxleitner,
T. Debuisschert, E. Diamanti, M. Dianati, J. Dynes, et al., “The secoqc
quantum key distribution network in vienna,” New Journal of Physics,
vol. 11, no. 7, p. 075001, 2009.
[6] Q. Zhang, F. Xu, Y.-A. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, and J.-W. Pan, “Large scale
quantum key distribution: challenges and solutions,” Optics express,
vol. 26, no. 18, pp. 24260–24273, 2018.
[7] M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka,
S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang, A. Tanaka, et al., “Field test of quantum
key distribution in the tokyo qkd network,” Optics express, vol. 19,
no. 11, pp. 10387–10409, 2011.
[8] R. Van Meter, T. Satoh, T. D. Ladd, W. J. Munro, and K. Nemoto, “Path
selection for quantum repeater networks,” Networking Science, vol. 3,
no. 1-4, pp. 82–95, 2013.
[9] K. Azuma, A. Mizutani, and H.-K. Lo, “Fundamental rate-loss trade-off
for the quantum internet,” Nature communications, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1–8,
2016.
[10] F. Hahn, A. Pappa, and J. Eisert, “Quantum network routing and local
complementation,” npj Quantum Information, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–7,
2019.
[11] G. Vardoyan, S. Guha, P. Nain, and D. Towsley, “On the stochastic
analysis of a quantum entanglement switch,” ACM SIGMETRICS Per-
formance Evaluation Review, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 27–29, 2019.
[12] S. Pirandola, “Capacities of repeater-assisted quantum communications,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1601.00966, 2016.
[13] J. Wallno¨fer, A. Pirker, M. Zwerger, and W. Du¨r, “Multipartite state
generation in quantum networks with optimal scaling,” Scientific reports,
vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–18, 2019.
[14] S. Pirandola, “End-to-end capacities of a quantum communication
network,” Communications Physics, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–10, 2019.
[15] M. Caleffi, “Optimal routing for quantum networks,” IEEE Access,
vol. 5, pp. 22299–22312, 2017.
[16] L. Gyongyosi and S. Imre, “Entanglement-gradient routing for quantum
networks,” Scientific reports, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1–14, 2017.
[17] M. Pant, H. Krovi, D. Towsley, L. Tassiulas, L. Jiang, P. Basu, D. En-
glund, and S. Guha, “Routing entanglement in the quantum internet,”
npj Quantum Information, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–9, 2019.
[18] K. Chakraborty, F. Rozpedek, A. Dahlberg, and S. Wehner, “Distributed
routing in a quantum internet,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.11630, 2019,
unpublished.
[19] M. Dianati, R. Alle´aume, M. Gagnaire, and X. Shen, “Architecture and
protocols of the future european quantum key distribution network,”
Security and Communication Networks, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 57–74, 2008.
[20] P. K. Tysowski, X. Ling, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Mosca, “The engineer-
ing of a scalable multi-site communications system utilizing quantum
key distribution (qkd),” Quantum Science and Technology, vol. 3, no. 2,
p. 024001, 2018.
[21] C. Yang, H. Zhang, and J. Su, “The qkd network: model and routing
scheme,” Journal of Modern Optics, vol. 64, no. 21, pp. 2350–2362,
2017.
[22] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dusˇek,
N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, “The security of practical quantum key
distribution,” Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 81, pp. 1301–1350, Sep 2009.
[23] S. Pirandola, U. L. Andersen, L. Banchi, M. Berta, D. Bunandar,
R. Colbeck, D. Englund, T. Gehring, C. Lupo, C. Ottaviani, et al.,
“Advances in quantum cryptography,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.01645,
2019.
[24] V. Scarani and R. Renner, “Quantum cryptography with finite resources:
Unconditional security bound for discrete-variable protocols with one-
way postprocessing,” Physical review letters, vol. 100, no. 20, p. 200501,
2008.
[25] A. K. Ekert, “Quantum cryptography based on bells theorem,” Physical
review letters, vol. 67, no. 6, p. 661, 1991.
[26] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the bb84 quantum
key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 85, pp. 441–444, Jul
2000.
[27] R. Renner, N. Gisin, and B. Kraus, “Information-theoretic security
proof for quantum-key-distribution protocols,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 72,
p. 012332, Jul 2005.
[28] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, “Decoy state quantum key distribution,”
Physical review letters, vol. 94, no. 23, p. 230504, 2005.
[29] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi, “Fundamental
limits of repeaterless quantum communications,” Nature communica-
tions, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1–15, 2017.
[30] P. Toliver, R. J. Runser, T. E. Chapuran, J. L. Jackel, T. C. Banwell, M. S.
Goodman, R. J. Hughes, C. G. Peterson, D. Derkacs, J. E. Nordholt,
et al., “Experimental investigation of quantum key distribution through
transparent optical switch elements,” IEEE Photonics Technology Let-
ters, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 1669–1671, 2003.
[31] C. Elliott, A. Colvin, D. Pearson, O. Pikalo, J. Schlafer, and H. Yeh,
“Current status of the darpa quantum network,” in Quantum Information
and computation III, vol. 5815, pp. 138–149, International Society for
Optics and Photonics, 2005.
[32] Y. Tanizawa, R. Takahashi, and A. R. Dixon, “A routing method
designed for a quantum key distribution network,” in 2016 Eighth
International Conference on Ubiquitous and Future Networks (ICUFN),
pp. 208–214, IEEE, 2016.
[33] M. Mehic, P. Fazio, S. Rass, O. Maurhart, M. Peev, A. Poppe,
J. Rozhon, M. Niemiec, and M. Voznak, “A novel approach to quality-of-
service provisioning in trusted relay quantum key distribution networks,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2019.
[34] Q. Li, Y. Wang, H. Mao, J. Yao, and Q. Han, “Mathematical model
and topology evaluation of quantum key distribution network,” Optics
Express, vol. 28, no. 7, pp. 9419–9434, 2020.
